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Abstract 
We argue that income inequality increases the level of corruption through material 
and normative mechanisms. The wealthy have both greater motivation and 
opportunity to engage in corruption, while the poor are more vulnerable to extortion 
and less able to monitor and hold the rich and powerful accountable as inequality 
increases. Inequality also adversely affects people’s social norms about corruption and 
beliefs about the legitimacy of rules and institutions, and thereby makes it easier to 
tolerate corruption as acceptable behavior. 
Our comparative analysis of 129 countries utilizing two-staged least squares methods 
with a variety of instrumental variables supports our hypotheses, using different 
measures of corruption (the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index and the 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index). The explanatory power 
of inequality is at least as important as conventionally accepted causes of corruption 
such as economic development. We also find a significant interaction effect between 
inequality and democracy, and evidence that inequality affects norms and perceptions 
about corruption, using the World Values Survey data. Since corruption also 
contributes to income inequality, societies often fall into vicious circles of inequality 
and corruption.  
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A Comparative Study of  
Inequality and Corruption 
 
Does income inequality affect corruption? This important question has seldom 
been addressed by social scientists. Although cross-national statistical studies on the 
causes of corruption have proliferated (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Treisman 2000; 
Paldam 2002; Montinola and Jackman 2002), sociological theorizing and research on 
corruption is surprisingly rare. While political scientists and economists have 
examined corruption primarily in relation to economic development rather than to 
inequality, sociologists who examine inequality have paid scant attention to the 
problem of corruption.  As a consequence, the relationships between inequality and 
corruption are grossly understudied.  
This article makes three sets of contributions to the literature on cross-national 
variation in corruption. We first offer a theoretical account for why income inequality 
increases corruption generally, and counterintuitively in democratic political systems.  
We also argue that inequality fosters a norm of corruption as acceptable behavior, 
corruption is likely to reinforce or widen existing inequalities, and vicious circles of 
inequality-corruption-inequality are thus likely to manifest. 
Secondly, the predictive ability of income inequality, and the interaction between 
inequality and democracy, are empirically tested against competing conventional 
explanations of corruption. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, this paper offers the 
first systematic cross-country statistical study focusing on the causal effect of income 
inequality on corruption.  In addition, evidence on the relationship between 
inequality, perceptions and norms of corruption, as well as the reverse causation from 
corruption to inequality is provided. 
The third set of contributions is methodological.  Previous cross-national studies 
on causes of corruption have primarily utilized ordinary least squares (OLS) methods.  
As a result, these studies did not directly address critical issues of simultaneous 
causation or measurement error.  We employ a range of instrumental variables and 
 4
two-staged least squares (2SLS) methods to substantially correct for these problems.  
We also use a wide array of controls as well as different measures for corruption to 
test the robustness of our results. 
We first briefly review major sets of theoretical explanations and results from 
previous empirical studies on corruption. In section 2, we advocate much greater 
attention to inequality, a factor that has received little attention by scholars.  We 
describe the data and methods employed to investigate our hypotheses in section 3.  
Empirical findings and theoretical interpretations from our statistical work are 
presented in section 4.  The final section concludes with some research and policy 
implications. 
 
1. Existing Explanations and Empirical Findings 
We utilize a somewhat narrow but widely accepted definition of corruption, i.e., 
abuse of public power (or public office) for private gain. Although we do not see any 
reasons to exclude corporate embezzlement, fraud in the non-profit sector, etc., from 
the definition, there are no available cross-national measures that capture this fuller 
range of corruption.  
Until recently, statistical studies of corruption have suffered from the lack of 
reliable quantitative data. As the data on the (perceived) levels of corruption became 
available for a large number of countries, cross-country statistical research 
bourgeoned. Although these studies generated a considerable consensus regarding the 
negative effects of corruption on economic development, undermining the 
long-advocated functional view of corruption, studies on the causes of corruption did 
not produce general agreement (Lambsdorff 1999; Andvig et al. 2000). Numerous 
variables have been suggested as causes of corruption, which can be classified into 
three broad categories of economic, political, and cultural explanations. 
Economic factors are often considered the prime causes of corruption. Economic 
development (per capita income), ostensibly through the spread of education, creation 
of a middle class, etc., was found to be the strongest determinant for reducing 
corruption in many studies (Treisman 2000; Paldam 2002). In contrast, Kaufmann and 
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Kraay (2002) argued that causation ran from lower corruption to economic 
development and not from higher income to less corruption. Trade openness 
presumably through increased economic competition and economic growth was found 
to be significantly negatively associated with corruption  by Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) and Treisman (2000) although, according to Torrez (2002), its significance 
depended on the choice of corruption index. The significance of the relative wages of 
public servants in controlling corruption depended on the measures and the 
specifications used (Rijckeghem and Weder 1997; Evans and Rauch 1999). Countries 
with larger endowments of natural resources were found to be significantly more 
corrupt, probably because windfall gains offer greater opportunities for corruption 
(Ades and Di Tella 1999; Leite and Weidman 1999; Gylfason 2001). 
Political explanations of corruption include variables such as democracy, 
government size, and decentralization. Although democracy (electoral competition, 
political rights, etc.) is theoretically supposed to provide checks against corruption, 
empirical studies found differing results.1 Treisman (2000) concluded that 
democracies are significantly less corrupt only after 40 years. Montinola and Jackman 
(2002) demonstrated that the effect of democracy may be nonlinear; partial 
democratization may increase corruption but once past a threshold, democracy 
inhibits corruption. The size of government or extent of government intervention was 
proposed to increase corruption (LaPalombara 1994), yet empirical evidence shows 
that larger governments are less corrupt (La Porta et al. 1999; Friedman et al. 2000). 
And the findings on the effect of decentralization are contradictory (Treisman 2000; 
Fisman and Gatti 2002).  
Cultural and historical explanations of corruption have highlighted the effects of 
religion, cultural values, colonial heritage, legal traditions, and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. Egalitarian or individualistic religions like Protestantism may 
encourage challenges to abuses by office-holders, while hierarchical religions such as 
Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam may discourage such challenges.  
                                                 
1 Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues that elections increase the accountability of politicians, but also 
produce new incentives for corruption as political financing needs increase. 
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Protestantism’s link with economic development and democracy offer two additional 
causal pathways. Protestantism was found to be significantly associated with less 
corruption by many empirical studies (La Porta et. al. 1999; Sandholtz and Koetzle 
2000; Treisman 2000; Paldam 2001). 
Colonial experience and legal system are closely correlated. La Porta et al. (1999) 
proposed that legal systems are reflective of the relative power of the state vis-à-vis 
property owners. While the British common law system was developed as a defense 
of property owners against the attempts by the sovereign to expropriate property, civil 
law was developed as a sovereign instrument for state building and economic control. 
Treisman (2000) further argued that British legal traditions tend to emphasize the 
procedural fairness. He found former British colonies to be significantly less corrupt. 
While countries with French legal or socialist origins have higher levels of corruption, 
legal origins are insignificant controlling for other factors (La Porta et al. 1999). 
In addition, Huntington’s cultural areas of Western Europe, Latin America, and 
Old Communist countries (Paldam 2002) and Hofstede’s cultural values such as 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity (Husted 1999) were also 
significant predictors of corruption. Although some scholars suggested ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization would increase corruption (Mauro 1995), its significance 
disappeared after adding per capita income and latitude controls (La Porta et al. 
1999). 
 
II. Inequality and Corruption 
The relationship between inequality and corruption was not rigorously theorized 
or systematically examined in any of these previous studies. Our overall argument is 
that greater levels of inequality are social structurally conducive through material and 
normative mechanisms to higher levels of corruption. Thus we should find a direct 
empirical relationship between inequality and corruption, controlling for other factors.  
We focus on income inequality in this article.2
                                                 
2 Two studies found a significant effect of gender equality on corruption (Swamy et al. 1999; Dollar, Fisman, and 
Gatti 2001). They found that women were less involved in bribery and less likely to condone the practice of taking 
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H1 – Greater income inequality will be associated with higher levels of corruption 
One of the central theoretical arguments in the literature is that corruption is a 
function of motivations and opportunities (Rose-Ackerman 1978, 1999; Klitgaard 
1988). As income inequality increases, the rich have more to lose through fair 
political, administrative, and judicial processes. As inequality increases, the rich will 
also have greater resources that can be used to buy influence, both legally and 
illegally (Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 2003). The rich as a class or interest 
groups can employ legal lobbying and political contributions or bribery (grand 
political corruption) to influence law-making processes. The rich, as interest groups, 
firms, or individuals may use bribery or connections to influence law-implementing 
processes (bureaucratic corruption) and to buy favorable interpretations of the law 
(judicial corruption). 
As inequality increases, the majority of the population will be relatively poorer, 
and are likely to demand more extensive redistribution through higher levels of 
progressive taxation (Meltzer and Richard 1981).3  As the redistributive pressures 
increase, the rich correspondingly have greater motivation to employ political 
corruption in order to lower the tax rates and bureaucratic corruption in order to 
further circumvent the collection of taxes.  
While the rich are more motivated and capable to behave corruptly at higher 
levels of inequality, the non-rich have more to gain from combating corruption. The 
middle class and the poor generally have cause to monitor, expose, and halt the 
corruption by the rich and the powerful. However, the poor lack material resources to 
organize, and a thin middle class is likely to exert less influence in high-inequality 
societies. High levels of inequality (and associated poverty), holding other factors 
equal, is thus likely to inhibit the capacities of middle class and poor groups to 
monitor the corrupt activities of the rich and powerful (McCarthy and Zald 1977; 
                                                                                                                                            
bribes. They also found that corruption was less severe where women comprise a larger share of the labor force 
and hold a larger share of parliamentary seats. 
3 Higher inequality is typically associated with greater skewness to the right as well as greater gap between the rich 
and the poor.  
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Tarrow 1994). Greater equality is likely to entail a larger middle class that can act to 
protect its interests (Husted 1999). 
Moreover, in high-inequality societies, the large numbers of poor are more likely 
to be deprived of basic public services such as education and health care than in low 
inequality countries.  Hence, they are more likely to rely on petty corruption or be 
the targets of bureaucratic extortion in order to secure basic services. Although the 
amount of their actual payment of kickbacks may be small because of the limited 
ability to pay, the poor will perceive corruption levels to be very high and come to see 
corruption as an appropriate form of behavior.  
But the impact of income inequality on corruption will differ between more 
democratic and less democratic countries. In countries with authoritarian regimes, the 
rich and the powerful can employ or promote repression to advance their interests. In 
democratic countries, however, oppression as a substitute for corruption cannot be 
employed, and hence the rich have to rely on corruption more and more as inequality 
increases and redistributive pressures grow. While countries with more authoritarian 
regimes are likely to have higher levels of corruption on average, the effect of 
inequality on corruption will be higher in more democratic countries.  
In addition, in a highly unequal society with elections, a large number of poor 
people are likely to sell their votes in exchange for money, gifts, or other favors, while 
the rich and the powerful will buy votes in order to maintain the status quo of 
inequality. The poor are likely to be satisfied with small benefits by participating in 
petty corrupt exchanges and patronage instead of resisting grand corruption by the 
rich and the powerful, thus allowing them much larger benefits.  
H2: The adverse effect of inequality on corruption will be larger in more 
democratic countries. 
 
Human behavior is powerfully determined by values, norms, and perceptions 
(March and Olson 1989; Dowse and Hughes 1986). Values of integrity may differ 
across individuals, groups and societies. Religion may have an impact on values and 
norms about corruption. However, people across highly corrupt countries with widely 
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different religious traditions, and even those people who engage in corruption 
themselves are often found to dislike corruption, combining excuse with 
condemnation (Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina 2002). 
Tolerance of corruption as acceptable behavior may be explained not only by 
religious values but also by perceptions of the extent of corruption and associated 
widespread social networks for corruption. If people are surrounded by corruption or 
perceive this to be the case, they may have to accept and even participate in 
corruption in spite of their values. In surveys people justify their corrupt behavior by 
citing its prevalence (Rose-Ackerman 2001). Corrupt transactions often require the 
involvement of multiple actors, and the consequent networks of corruption will offer 
more social structural support for participation in corrupt activities (Warburton 2001).   
Correspondingly, we argue that income inequality affects people’s perceptions of 
the extent of corruption and habituates norms about corruption. At higher levels of 
inequality, the rich are likely to increasingly believe that corruption is a more 
acceptable way of preserving and advancing their societal position as this behavior 
goes unpunished and social networks of corruption expand.  In addition, people are 
more likely to consider political institutions and rules in unequal societies as favoring 
the rich, unjust and lacking legitimacy. More people are likely to circumvent laws and 
regulations when they are considered illegitimate. Thus, people will more easily 
justify their corrupt activities as inequality increases.  
Moreover, at higher levels of inequality, most non-rich people are likely to believe 
that the rich and powerful must be corrupt and it is impossible to do well honestly. 
Hence, they are likely to justify their own corrupt behavior, in addition to finding it 
difficult to hold the rich and powerful accountable. As the rich and the non-rich 
engage in corruption, corrupt practices spread and corrupt networks further expand 
and deepen. Thus, corruption becomes a norm. As corrupt practices spread and are 
habituated as “how things are done” in highly unequal societies, the norm of 
corruption is socialized by subsequent generations.  
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H3: Perceptions and norms on the extent and acceptability of corruption will be 
higher in more unequal societies. 
Corruption tends to reinforce or widen already existing inequalities (Johnston 
1989).  Corruption contributes to inequality by facilitating the unequal appropriation 
of wealth and privilege and by inhibiting institutional changes that could threaten 
existing advantages. Thus, we expect to see a persistence of corruption with the 
persistence of inequality, and hence a mutually reinforcing relationship between 
inequality and corruption.  
H4: Higher levels of corruption will be associated with higher levels of inequality. 
 
We did not find any statistical examination specifically focused on the effect of 
income inequality on corruption, although two empirical studies (Husted 1999; 
Paldam 2002) included income inequality as one of explanatory variables and tested 
its effect through OLS regressions.  Neither found a statistically significant effect, 
but this negative finding was probably the result of inefficiency and attenuation bias 
from measurement errors in the inequality and corruption indicators employed. 
The empirical tests conducted by Husted (1999) and Paldam (2002) were far from 
rigorous, and both authors’ primary focus was on cultural variables. Husted (1999) 
used Transparency International(TI)’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 1996 
and income share of the top 10% in 1996 from the World Bank’s data for a sample of 
only 36 countries. Paldam (2002) used TI’s CPI for 1999 and gini coefficients for 
different years from the World Bank’s data for samples of 85 to 100 countries. Both 
authors’ OLS regressions showed only per capita income and cultural variables 
(cultural values for Husted and cultural areas for Paldam) were significant. 
Although both studies found inequality to be insignificant, measurement error in 
the income inequality measures may have caused substantial attenuation bias in their 
estimates. Both authors used a single measure of corruption and inequality for a single 
year, making their results particularly vulnerable to charges of spuriousness. Husted’s 
small sample size further raises the possibility of selection bias. 
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Both authors employed OLS regressions, which cannot address potential biases 
associated with measurement error, omitted variables, and reverse causation.4 The 
relative size of reverse causality may be greater for per capita income, which will 
cause relative overestimation for per capita income. The measurement error is likely 
to be far greater for inequality, which will cause relative underestimation for 
inequality. Thus, we believe that there is substantial room for more rigorous statistical 
analysis of the effect of inequality on corruption. 
The effect of corruption on inequality, in contrast, was more rigorously examined.  
Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (2002) and Li, Xu, and Zou (2000) found a 
significant effect of corruption on inequality through cross-country analysis. Gupta et 
al. (2002) suggested that corruption increased inequality by perpetuating an unequal 
distribution of asset ownership and unequal access to education, minimizing the 
progressiveness of the tax system, lowering the level and effectiveness of social 
spending, and by lowering economic growth.     
 
III. Data and Methods 
Different studies have frequently produced varying results depending on the 
model specifications, statistical methods as well as measures used.  We address 
many of these problems in our analysis. 
Income Inequality Measures. We use gini coefficients based on the high-quality 
income distribution data compiled by Dollar and Kraay (2002). They assembled data 
from four sources including Deininger and Squire(1996) and the UN-WIDER Income 
Inequality Database.  
The gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where a gini of zero represents perfect 
equality and a gini of one means only one person or household has the total income in 
the country. Since income-based ginis are substantially higher than expenditure-based 
ginis, and differences also exist between gross income-based ginis and net 
income-based ginis, as well as between household-based ginis and person-based ginis, 
                                                 
4 Paldam stated that instrumental variables 2SLS method was used for one economic sub-model, but 
the results were not presented.  
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we appropriately adjusted the raw data based on different definitions to make them 
comparable with household net expenditure-based ginis. Our adjustments for the data 
are as follows. “Adjusted gini (GINI) = gini – .0398 income – .0123 gross + .0112 
person.” The coefficients are based on the regression of gini on these three variables, 
country dummies, and decade dummies (See Appendix 1, located on the ASR 
website, for the details).  
Since the effect of inequality on corruption is likely to be long-term, it is better to 
use averages over a longer period rather than data for a single year. The average 
values of the adjusted gini (GINI) for the period of 1971-1996, which are available for 
129 countries, will be used as an independent variable when perceived corruption for 
the period of 1996-2002 is the dependent variable. The average values for the period 
of 1990s, available for 114 countries, will be used as a dependent variable when we 
examine the reverse causation from corruption to inequality.  
In addition, by extending the period, we can also minimize measurement error. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that variation within countries over time 
explains only 2.1% of the total variation, while variation between countries explains 
91.3% of the total variation.5 A substantial part of the variation in inequality within 
countries across time is likely to come from measurement error, and averaging will 
help reduce it.6
Corruption Measures. The main indicators for corruption are the World Bank 
Institute (WBI)’s Control of Corruption Index (CCI) and the Transparency 
International (TI)’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The two data sets are 
regarded as the most reliable for cross-national comparisons and cover a large number 
of countries. We also use the Political Risk Service’s (PRS) International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) index of corruption for a robustness check.7 These indices 
                                                 
5 Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) also showed that 92% of the variance in Deininger and Squire (1996) data on gini 
coefficients for 112 countries for the years 1947-1994 is cross-country variance, while only 1% is over-time 
variance. This is evidence for the persistence of income inequality across countries over time. 
6 Assuming that measurement error has a normal distribution with the mean of zero and variance of σ2, 
averaging of N observations will reduce the variance to σ2/N. 
7 Although the ICRG index of corruption is widely used by scholars, Lambsdorff (forthcoming) warns against its 
reliability, noting that it measures “political risks” rather than the degrees of corruption. 
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represent the perceived level of integrity or freedom from corruption, since a higher 
number indicates a lower level of corruption. The CCI is a standardized score with the 
mean of zero and the standard deviation of one (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
2003). The CPI ranges from zero to ten (Lambsdorff forthcoming), and the ICRG 
index from zero to six.  
We use the average values of these indices for the period from 1996 to 2002 for 
corruption as a dependent variable. CCI 1996-2002 (average for 1996, 1998, 2000, 
and 2002) is available for 195 countries including all the 129 countries for which we 
have the GINI 1971-96 data. CPI 1996-2002 (average for 1996-2002) is available for 
109 countries. As an independent variable, CCI 1996-98 (average for 1996 and 98) 
and CPI 1996-99 (average for 1996-99) will be used, with the dependent variable of 
inequality for the period of 1990s. 
The WBI’s CCI and the TI’s CPI are based on various sources of survey data, 
while the PRS’s ICRG index of corruption is assessed by their country experts. The 
surveys that provide the basis of the CCI and the CPI mostly reflect the opinions of 
international business people and country experts. The various sources differently 
measure the perceived level of overall corruption, from the frequency of additional 
payments to get things done to the effects of corruption on the business environment 
to grand corruption. The CCI gives more weight to those data that are more highly 
correlated with the resulting aggregate index (Kaufmann et al. 2003). 
Our corruption data have some limits. Neither CCI nor CPI nor ICRG provides 
measures for various kinds of corruption. Hence it is impossible to test whether 
inequality affects particular types of corruption. Moreover, cross-country ratings 
based on the survey respondents’ (mainly international business people) perceptions 
or experts’ subjective judgments are not only imprecise but also can be biased. Thus, 
measurement error and systemic bias is a particular concern. Some critics raise the 
specific possibility of favoring rich countries by equating richness with cleanness 
(Kaufmann et al. 2003).  
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Yet, country corruption indices based on experts’ and international business 
people’s judgments are highly correlated with domestic public perceptions.8 And it is 
practically impossible to measure the actual levels of corruption across countries. We 
minimized the estimation inefficiency due to measurement error by using averaged 
data for several years (from 1996 to 2002) instead of data for a single year. We further 
reduced the possibility of reaching spurious conclusions by using three different 
measures of corruption.  
Perceptions and Norms. As the measure of perceptions and norms about 
corruption, we use the World Values Survey, conducted between 1995-97 in 50 
countries. The following four questions are relevant:   
Question 1: Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big 
interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 
1) Run by a few big interests, and 2) Run for all the people. 
Question 2: How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this 
country? 
1) Almost no public officials, 2) A few public officials, 3) Most public officials, and  
4) Almost all public officials are engaged in it. 
For Questions 3 and 4: Tell me for each of the following statements whether you 
think it can always be justified (10), never justified(1), or something in between 
(2-9). 
Question 3: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance. 
Question 4: Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties. 
 
Control Variables. We include several economic, political, and cultural variables 
that were identified as significant by previous studies:  
1. Economic development - Natural log of GDP per capita, average for 1971-96, 
calculated from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Missing 
values were supplemented using La Porta et al. (1999) and Treisman (2000) dataset. 
                                                 
8 Domestic public’s perceptions on the extent of corruption (World Values Survey, 1995-97) have a correlation 
coefficient of .85 and .86 with the CCI and the CPI, respectively. 
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2. Trade openness - Natural log of percentage imports plus exports over GDP, 
average for 1971-96, calculated from the WDI. Missing values were supplemented 
using La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman (2000), and Rodrik et al. (2002) dataset. 
3. Natural resource abundance - Share of fuel, ore and metal exports from the total 
merchandise exports, average for 1971-96, calculated from the WDI. 
4. Democracy - Political rights score, average for 1972-96, calculated from the 
Freedom House.9 The political rights score reflects (1) free and fair elections; (2) 
those elected rule; (3) there are competitive parties or other competitive political 
groups; (4) the opposition has an important role and power; and (5) the entities have 
self-determination or a high degree of autonomy. The original scores were converted 
such that a higher score represents more freedom. For countries that became 
independent after the collapse of Soviet Union and other former communist regimes, 
the political rights score for the former regimes were applied for the period before 
independence.  
5. Federalism - The sum of five indicators of federalism, average for 1975-1996, 
calculated from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institution (Keefer 2002): (1) 
the existence of autonomous regions, (2) whether municipal governments are locally 
elected, (3) whether state/province governments are locally elected, (4) whether the 
state/provinces have authority over taxing, spending or legislating, and (5) whether 
the constituencies of the senators are the states/provinces. 
6. Religion - percentage Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim in 1980, from La Porta 
et al. (1999). 
7. Legal origins - English Common Law (base category), French Commercial 
Code, Socialist/Communist Laws, German Commercial Code, and Scandinavian 
Commercial Code, from La Porta et al. (1999). 
8. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization - average value of ethnic fractionalization and 
linguistic fractionalization, from Alesina et al. (2003). 
                                                 
9 The Freedom House’s civil liberties score or combined score of freedom rating is not used, because 
the checklist for civil liberties has included the existence of extreme corruption and government 
indifference in its fourteen elements since 1984. 
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 Instrumental variables. In order to address the potential issue of simultaneous 
causation as well as the problem of measurement error, we utilized instrumental 
variables. On the one hand, since corruption is also likely to increase inequality, OLS 
may overestimate the coefficient for inequality. On the other hand, measurement error 
in inequality may cause attenuation bias. Omitted variables bias can be either positive 
or negative.  
Following Leigh (2003), we use “mature cohort size” relative to adult population 
as an instrument for inequality. Higgins and Williamson (1999) theorized the effect of 
cohort size on inequality. Since “fat cohorts” tend to get low rewards, when those fat 
cohorts lie at the top of the age-earnings curve, earnings inequality will be reduced. 
When the fat cohorts are old or young adults, earnings inequality is augmented. They 
show that the relative size of the cohort aged between 40 and 59 is a powerful 
predictor of inequality, both across countries and within the US.  
Indeed, mature cohort size (ratio of population aged between 40 and 59 to 
population aged 15 through 69, averaged for 1971-96; calculated from the UN 
population data) is a powerful predictor of inequality (See Appendix, Table A3, on 
the ASR website). It is reasonable to believe that it will not directly influence or be 
influenced by the level of corruption other than through its effect on inequality, 
controlling for other variables.10 The high correlation (r = -.72) between the 
instrument (mature cohort size) and the endogenous variable (inequality) and the 
presumably very weak, if any, correlation between the instrument and the error term 
of the regression will likely minimize the bias for the 2SLS estimator. 
We also consider the endogeneity of other variables. Economic development, 
trade openness, and democracy may also be influenced by corruption. Democracy 
(political rights score) is also likely to suffer from a large measurement error, while 
                                                 
10 One could raise doubt about our instrument by arguing that the mature cohort (those aged between 
40 and 59) might have more opportunity for corruption and be more prone to corruption. However, the 
World Values Survey data shows that the mature cohort is slightly less, but negligibly, likely to justify 
bribe-taking and their perceptions about corruption are similar to the rest of population (Table 4). 
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economic development (per capita income) and trade openness (exports plus imports 
over GDP) are likely to be more precisely measured.  
To obtain an unbiased estimate for the inequality coefficient, we just have to 
control for other variables that may be correlated with mature cohort size. We do not 
need instruments for other endogenous variables. However, we attempted to 
instrument other endogenous variables as well in order to get better unbiased 
estimates for them and compare the results based on different sets of instruments as 
robustness checks. We employed reasonably good instruments for economic 
development and trade openness, but were unable to find a suitable one for 
democracy.  
Following Treisman (2000), we use distance from equator (absolute value of 
latitude) as an instrument for economic development (per capita income). Latitude is 
known to be significantly associated with the levels of economic development, 
probably through the uneven distribution of climate (tropical vs. temperate climate) 
and diseases (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger 1999; McArthur and Sachs 2001). Since 
we do not see any reason why latitude is directly correlated with corruption, 
controlling for other variables, it is a potentially useful instrument for economic 
development.11
Gallup and Sachs (2000) demonstrated that malaria prevalence is a strong 
determinant of economic development but that malaria is very geographically specific 
and little affected by economic development. They show evidence that the ecological 
conditions that support the more efficient malaria mosquito vectors primarily 
determine the distribution and intensity of the disease. 12 Thus we use the index of 
malaria prevalence (the product of the fraction of land area subject to malaria times 
the fraction of falciparum malaria cases, average for 1966 and 1994; from Gallup and 
Sachs 2000) as another instrument for economic development.  
                                                 
11 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) argue that quality of 
institutions, not geography, determines the levels of economic development. McArthur and Sachs (2001) argue 
that both geography and institutions matter. 
12 Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that malaria prevalence is endogenous; it is the poorer countries with worse 
institutions that have been unable to eradicate malaria. It is beyond our scope to examine the conflicting arguments 
about the prevalence of malaria. 
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We confirm that both latitude (absolute value) and malaria prevalence have very 
strong predictive power (Appendix Table A3). The simple correlation between 
latitude and per capita income is .54, and that between malaria index and per capita 
income is -.63. Jointly together, they are highly significant for economic 
development, controlling for other covariates. Although the exact causal relationship 
between geography and economic development is still being debated, these two 
variables are reasonably good instruments for our purposes.13
As an instrument for trade openness, we use “constructed openness” (natural 
logarithm of predicted trade shares from a bilateral trade equation with “pure” 
geography variables; computed by Rodrik et. al. 2002, following Frankel and Romer 
1999). Since geography should not inherently be correlated with corruption, this is a 
valid instrument.  
Our instruments satisfy the required statistical properties very well. The F- 
statistics for the null hypothesis that the instruments are partially uncorrelated 
(controlling for exogenous variables) with inequality, per capita income, and openness 
are sufficiently high (all greater than 10), and the values of R-squared are sufficiently 
large (between 0.42 and 0.73; Appendix Table A3). We also conducted 
over-identification tests whenever it was possible. The reported P-values for the 
over-identification tests are generally large enough to not reject the null hypothesis 
that our instruments are uncorrelated with the error term of the corruption equation 
(Table 3 on p.30, Appendix Tables A7-A9 on the ASR website).  
 
IV. Results and Interpretations 
 
First we demonstrate the utility of employing multiple measures for (freedom 
from) corruption and data averaged over many years for corruption and inequality. 
We then report and interpret our results. 
                                                 
13 Even if we consider the possibility that latitude or malaria prevalence is correlated with the error term of the 
regression, i.e., Corr(z,u) ≠ 0, it is not likely to be large. Since Corr(z,x) is substantially large, and we suspect 
Corr(x,u) is quite large, IV estimator is likely to be better unbiased than OLS estimator. X, z, and u denote, 
respectively, the endogenous variable (per capita income), the instrumental variables (latitude and malaria index), 
and the error term of the corruption regression (Wooldridge 2002). 
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 Use of averaged data and different measures of corruption:  
Table 1 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for which TI’s 
CPI and WBI’s CCI for 1998 and the average for 1996-2002 were used as the 
measures of corruption, the dependent variable in this analysis, and inequality (GINI), 
per capita income (natural log of GDP per capita), political rights score, and trade 
openness (natural log of percentage imports plus exports over GDP) for 1995 and the 
average for 1971-96 (1972-96 for political rights)14 were used as explanatory 
variables, controlling for the percentage Protestant in 1980.  
 
“TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE” 
 
For the same dependent variable measure of corruption, estimated coefficients for 
inequality and political rights always become larger in magnitude and more 
significant and those for per capita income always decrease when averaged data of the 
independent variables are used instead of single-year data. For CPI 98, the magnitude 
of the estimated standardized coefficients for inequality and political rights increases 
from .03 to .08 and from .03 to .24, respectively, while the estimate for per capita 
income decreases from .64 to .46, as we switch the independent variable measures 
from single-year to averaged data. This result suggests that OLS estimates for 
single-year data are biased upward for per capita income, and toward zero for 
inequality and political rights, because the latter two contain larger measurement 
error.  
The table also shows that estimated coefficients for inequality and other 
explanatory variables vary depending on whether CPI or CCI is used as the dependent 
variable.  Inequality is insignificant when the single-year CPI is used, while it is 
significant when either single-year or averaged CCI is used. This suggests that 
measurement errors in CPI and/or CCI are correlated with inequality and other 
                                                 
14 Note that the Freedom House began to publish country ratings in 1972. 
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independent variable(s). Thus the measures of (freedom from) corruption contain 
substantial error and may also be systemically biased.  
When the averaged data are used for both the dependent and independent 
variables, however, inequality is significant regardless of the corruption measure 
controlling for per capita income, political rights, trade openness, and Protestantism. 
The standardized coefficients for inequality (GINI 71-96) are -.11 for CPI 96-02 and 
-.17 for CCI 96-02. Thus, averaging helps reduce measurement errors, although it 
may not solve the problem of systemic bias in corruption measures.   
 
The influence of inequality on corruption: 
 We test our hypotheses in a sample of 129 countries for which both GINI 
(1971-96) and CCI (1996-2002) are available. For robustness checks, we compare the 
regression results for CCI with those based on different measures of corruption (CPI 
and ICRG, average for 1996-2002).15 The tables of the results for the CPI and ICRG 
index are presented in the Appendix on the ASR website. 
Table 2 presents the OLS regression results of various specifications for a sample 
of 129 countries. The measures of the key four explanatory variables (inequality, per 
capita income, political rights, and openness) are all averaged for the period of 
1971(1972) to 1996.  
A striking contrast is evident between the bivariate regression (OLS 1) and the 
simplest multiple regression (OLS 2). The simple correlation between inequality 
(GINI) and control of corruption (CCI) is -.39 and highly significant. However, after 
including per capita income, inequality is insignificant with the standardized 
coefficient of -.06, while per capita income is highly significant with the standardized 
coefficient of .79. Is it economic development and not inequality that matters for 
corruption? 
 
“TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE” 
                                                 
15 The number of countries covered varies depending on thecorruption measure used; 102 and 110 countries are 
included in our sample for CPI and ICRD, respectively. Running the regressions for CCI with the sample of 102 
countries or 110 countries produce similar estimates as for the sample of 129 countries. 
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 But the situation is reversed as more controls are introduced. Including either 
democracy (political rights) or socialist legal origin contributes to magnifying the 
coefficient for inequality (from -.06 to -.13 or -.23) and to decreasing that for per 
capita income (OLS 3 and 4). We see that democracy is highly positively correlated 
with both per capita income and (freedom from) corruption and somewhat negatively 
correlated with inequality (Appendix Table A2, on the ASR website). Hence, 
omission of this variable causes substantial upward bias for per capita income and 
some attenuation bias for inequality.  
Countries with socialist legal origins have a significantly more equal distribution 
of income than others, but are significantly more corrupt on average (Appendix Table 
A4). The omitted variables bias from not controlling for legal origins considerably 
reduced the magnitude of the coefficient for inequality.  Results of running the same 
regression as OLS 2 separately for countries with socialist vs. non-socialist legal 
origin demonstrate that greater inequality is significantly associated with higher 
corruption within both sets of countries (Appendix Table A5). Thus, failure to 
consider different conditions between socialist and non-socialist legal origins 
obscures the effect of inequality on corruption. 
OLS 5 controls for openness, Protestantism, legal origins, federalism, 
ethnoliguistic fractionalization, and natural resource abundance as well as per capita 
income and political rights.16 15 countries have missing values for either natural 
resource abundance or federalism, so OLS 5 covers 114 countries only. In order to use 
the available information as fully as possible and to maintain the sample of 129 
countries, we employed the method of multiple imputation for the missing data in 
OLS 6 (Allison 2002; King et al. 2001).17  
OLS regressions 5 and 6 show that the coefficients for inequality are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and their magnitude is substantial. The 
                                                 
16 Neither percentage Catholics nor percentage Muslims  was significant. We dropped these variables 
in the reported regressions. 
17 We used King et al.’s software, Amelia (available at http://GKing.Harvard.Edu), for multiple imputation. We ran 
the same regressions for the five imputed data sets and combined the results to produce a single set of estimates for 
each regression. 
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coefficients for inequality and other variables do not change considerably between 
OLS 5 and 6, and a one-standard-deviation reduction in income inequality (0.11 
decrease in GINI) is associated with about a quarter (0.25 in OLS 5 and 0.23 in OLS 
7) standard deviation improvement in corruption (as measured by CCI). Since we 
control for the most significant variables in previous studies, omitted variables bias is 
not a great concern. These estimates are arguably the best that can be obtained by 
using OLS regression methods.  
Running the same regressions using CPI and ICRG measures of corruption as the 
dependent variable produces similar results. Inequality is significant for CPI and 
ICRG at the 1% or 5% level with the same controls as OLS 5 and 6. A 
one-standard-deviation reduction in income inequality is associated with about 0.21 
(or 0.26) standard deviation improvement in CPI (or ICRG) (Appendix Table A6, 
OLS 2 and 6). 
This finding is radically different from Husted (1999) and Paldam (2002). Their 
use of single-year CPI and single-year measure of inequality probably produced 
biased results, from attenuation bias due to measurement error in inequality, 
inefficiency due to measurement error in CPI, and perhaps omitted variables bias and 
additional bias due to systemic bias in CPI.18  
We also see that the standardized coefficients for per capita income are the largest 
and highly significant, as previous studies have consistently found. Democracy 
(political rights) is significant without controlling for legal origins (Table 1 and Table 
2, OLS 3), but generally insignificant controlling for legal origins and other variables 
(Table 2, OLS 5 and 6). However, when we include a quadratic term of political 
rights, it is significant (OLS 8), consistent with the finding of the nonlinear effect of 
democracy by Montinola and Jackman (2002). Trade openness is generally 
insignificant or weakly positively significant for CCI, but strongly significant for CPI 
and ICRG (Appendix Table A6).  
                                                 
18 It is possible that CPI does not have systemic bias and CCI has systemic bias.  
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We see that Protestantism is significantly associated with freedom from corruption 
irrespective of specification and choice of corruption measure, as previous studies 
have found. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is significantly associated with higher 
levels of corruption for CCI, but not CPI and ICRG (Appendix Table A6). Federalism 
and natural resource abundance are not significant. 
 
The interaction effect of inequality and democracy:  
Figure 1 demonstrates that control of corruption (CCI 96-02) and income 
inequality (GINI 71-96) are highly negatively correlated with each other for more 
democratic countries with a mean political rights score (72-96) of four or more, but 
the correlation is weak for less democratic countries with a score of less than four. 
This is consistent with our hypothesis that the effect of inequality on corruption is 
greater in more democratic countries.  
 
“FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE” 
 
In order to more rigorously test this hypothesis, we included an interaction term of 
inequality (GINI) and democracy (difference from the mean political rights score of 
4). We see the estimated coefficient for the interaction term is highly significant and 
large in OLS 7 in Table 2. A one-standard-deviation improvement in inequality (0.11 
reduction in GINI) is associated with –2.146*(-0.11) = 0.24 points or 0.24 standard 
deviation improvement in control of corruption (CCI) at the mean political rights 
score of 4. But it increases in magnitude to {–2.146-0.774*3}*(-0.11)= 0.49 points or 
0.49 standard deviation of CCI at the maximum political rights score of 7, while it 
decreases as the country’s political rights score declines. 
The interaction term is still significant with the inclusion of a quadratic term of 
democracy (OLS 8). Thus the adverse effect of inequality on corruption is higher in 
more democratic countries even taking into account the nonlinear effect of 
democracy. The interaction term is also highly significant for CPI and ICRG 
(Appendix Table A6).  
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Separate regressions also yield a highly significant and large coefficient estimate 
for inequality for the sample of more democratic countries, while the estimated 
coefficient for inequality is insignificant and small for the sample of less democratic 
countries (Appendix Table A8). These results support our hypothesis of greater effect 
of inequality on corruption in more democratic countries. 
 
The causal effect of inequality on corruption: 
We have established that a significant partial correlation between inequality and 
corruption exists controlling for many other plausible variables. We next used 
instrumental variables (IV) to provide better evidence of a causal influence from 
inequality to corruption and obtain even better unbiased estimates for the effect of 
inequality on corruption..  
We will begin from the simplest IV regressions, in which only inequality (GINI) 
is instrumented.  
CCIi = ß0 + ß1 GINIi + (Xi ) + εi   
GINIi = γ0 + γ1 Maturei + (γ2 Xi) + ηi
where X denotes covariates, and ε is random error term. 
The OLS estimates for ß1 can be biased due to omitted variables, measurement 
error in inequality, as well as reverse causality from corruption to inequality. A good 
instrument can cure all these potential biases. We instrument inequality with mature 
cohort size. If mature cohort size is not correlated with any other independent 
variables, we need not control for other variables.  
However, mature cohort size is correlated with per capita income and political 
rights as well. Hence, we present IV estimation both with and without controls in 
order to compare the results with those of OLS regressions. In order to make the 
results comparable with those of OLS for the same sample of 129 countries, we 
present the IV regression results based on the multiple imputation of missing data 
together.   
The instrumental variables two-staged least squares (IV 2SLS) estimated 
coefficients for inequality in Table 3 are much larger than their corresponding OLS 
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estimates in Table 2, both with and without controls. Without controls, the magnitude 
of standardized coefficient for inequality increases from 0.39 to 0.82 (OLS 1 vs. IV 
1). With the same set of controls as OLS 7, the standardized coefficient for inequality 
increases from 0.23 to 0.63 or 0.73 (IV 2 with listwise deletion, or IV 3 with multiple 
imputation), and it is significant at the 1% level. This is probably our best estimate of 
the causal effect of inequality on corruption.  
 
 “TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE” 
 
The standardized coefficient for per capita income is smaller than that for 
inequality in IV 2 and 3. Trade openness is significant only in IV 3. In order to obtain 
better estimates for per capita income, trade openness, and inequality, we 
instrumented these three endogenous variables with four instruments of mature cohort 
size, latitude, malaria index, and constructed openness in IV 4 and 5. We also 
introduced the same set of controls as OLS 6, and employed multiple imputation for 
the missing data in IV 5. The estimated standardized coefficients for inequality, 
controlling for other factors, is -.81 (IV 4 and 5), much larger in magnitude than its 
OLS counterpart of -.23. However, the standardized coefficient for per capita income 
is .31 or .29, much smaller than its OLS counterpart of .49 (OLS 6). Inequality is 
significant at 1% level, but per capita income and trade openness are not significant.  
In sum, the various IV 2SLS regressions give substantial evidence that inequality 
has a significant and large causal effect on corruption. A one standard deviation 
reduction in inequality causes about a two thirds standard deviation improvement in 
freedom from corruption (CCI), other factors being equal (IV 2, IV 3). The use of 
instrumental variables consistently increases the magnitude of the coefficient for 
inequality and decreases that for per capita income. Although each of our instruments 
may not be perfect, they are not likely to all be wrong in the same direction.19 Thus 
the weight of the evidence supports our hypotheses that inequality increases 
                                                 
19 If the instruments are all wrong in the same way, they can pass the overidentification test. 
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corruption and that large measurement error for inequality causes substantial 
attenuation bias in OLS.20  
IV 2SLS results using other measures of corruption are also consistent with our 
hypotheses. These estimates for inequality are always larger than corresponding OLS 
estimates regardless of the corruption measure being employed, while those for per 
capita income are smaller than OLS estimates. We also find that the IV 2SLS 
estimates for inequality and per capita income differ depending on the choice of 
corruption measures. The estimated standardized coefficient for inequality is smallest 
for CPI with -.26 when only inequality is instrumented and -.33 when three 
endogenous variables are instrumented (Appendix Table A7, IV 2 and 4), but it is still 
statistically significant and larger in magnitude than its corresponding OLS estimate 
of -.21 (Appendix Table A6, OLS 2). IV regressions of ICRG also produced larger 
standardized coefficient for inequality of -.43 (with inequality only instrumented; 
Table A7 in Appendix on the ASR website, IV 6) or -.57 (with three variables 
instrumented; Table A7 in Appendix on the ASR website, IV 8) than their OLS 
counterpart of -.26 (Table A6 in Appendix on the ASR website, OLS 6).  
A substantial part of the difference between these estimates was due to the 
difference in the sample, because CPI and ICRG are available for a smaller number of 
countries, but we cannot rule out the possibility of systemic bias in corruption 
measures.   For example, if we run the IV 2 in Table 3 for the same sample of 91 
countries for which both CPI and CCI are available, the standardized coefficients for 
inequality are -.38 for CCI and -.26 for CPI. Thus, the difference in the estimates is 
not as large as it seemed.  
By using CCI as our corruption measure, the sample size was increased and 
selection bias was minimized. Previous studies were often based on relatively fewer 
countries, which raises the question of external validity. Although we cannot produce 
a single, reliable estimate of the causal effect of inequality on corruption, we can 
                                                 
20 In addition, the magnitude of reverse causality from corruption to economic development is perhaps 
larger than that from corruption to inequality, which will cause further upward bias for per capita 
income.  
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confirm the existence of a statistically significant and substantively important causal 
effect running from inequality to corruption. 
 
Further robustness checks: 
We conducted multiple robustness checks in addition to the use of different 
corruption measures. First, we ran OLS and IV regressions separately for high-income 
vs. low-income countries (Appendix Table A9). Both OLS and IV regressions 
produced significant coefficients for inequality for the sample of high-income 
countries, but insignificant for low-income countries. Given the high correlation 
between per capita income and political rights, this is understandable.  
However, it raises the possibility that an interaction effect between inequality and 
per capita income exists and our results were biased from omitting this variable. 
When we included both interaction terms, the interaction of inequality with 
democracy outweighed that with economic development and only the former was 
significant (Appendix Table A10).  
Second, we ran OLS and IV regressions controlling for region dummies 
(Appendix Table A11). Since high levels of inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America may account for higher levels of corruption in those countries, region 
dummies may weaken the effect of inequality. However, inequality was generally 
significant even within regions. All these tests demonstrate that our findings are 
robust.  
 
Norms and perceptions of corruption:  
Now that we have found substantial empirical support for a causal relationship 
from inequality to corruption, it is important to empirically test our hypothesis of the 
effect of inequality on norms and perceptions about corruption, utilizing World 
Values Survey data. The sample covers over 36,000 individuals in 31 countries. 
 
“TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE” 
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OLS regression results in Table 4 show that people in countries with higher 
inequality are more likely to perceive that the society is run by a few big interests, and 
most public officials are corrupt. They also tend to justify bribe taking and cheating 
on taxes as acceptable behavior, holding individual characteristics such as income and 
education as well as other macro factors constant. This evidence supports our 
hypothesis that income inequality affects people’s perceptions of the extent of 
corruption and habituates norms about corruption. 
Interestingly, individuals in countries with higher per capita income are more 
likely to justify bribe taking and cheating on taxes, but their perceived extent of 
corruption is lower on average. Individual income has no effect on the norms. 
Individuals in more democratic countries are less likely to justify bribe taking, while 
people in countries with Socialist origin are more likely to justify bribe taking and 
tend to perceive more public officials are corrupt. However, religion had little impact 
on the norms and perceptions about corruption.21  
Although women are slightly less likely to justify bribe taking and cheating on 
taxes than men, consistent with the finding of Swamy et al. (1999), the gender 
difference was negligibly small. People aged between 40 and 59 (mature cohort) were 
slightly (almost negligibly) less likely to justify bribe taking or cheating on taxes, and 
showed no difference with other people in the perceived extent of corruption. 
 
The effect of corruption on inequality: 
Our OLS regressions confirm that corruption is significantly associated with 
income inequality, consistent with the previous findings (Gupta et al. 2002; Li et al. 
2000).  We regressed inequality (average adjusted Gini for 1990s) on two measures 
of perceived freedom from corruption (CCI average for 1996 and 1998, and CPI 
average for 1996-99).  
Table 5 indicates that the OLS estimated coefficients for CCI 96-98 is large and 
significant at the 1% level. A one standard deviation increase in CCI is associated 
                                                 
21 We regard standardized coefficients of less than 0.05 as negligible. 
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with a .44 standard deviation reduction in inequality for a sample of 114 countries, 
controlling for per capita income, political rights, trade openness, Protestantism, legal 
origins, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, natural resource abundance, and federalism 
(OLS 3). Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in CPI is associated with a .31 
standard deviation reduction in inequality with the same controls for a sample of 77 
countries (Appendix Table A12).   
 
“TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE” 
 
However, these estimates may be biased due to reverse causation as well as 
measurement error in corruption. Although we experimented with various sets of 
instruments for corruption, we were not able to find a good candidate (See Appendix 
2 on the ASR website). Thus, our results are inconclusive about the causal effect of 
corruption on inequality. The coefficient for corruption may have been overestimated 
due to reverse causation, but it may also have been underestimated due to 
measurement error in corruption. Since these two sources of bias are likely to cancel 
out rather than magnify, we suspect that the effect of corruption on inequality is in 
fact significant. 
Thus, there is evidence of reciprocal causation between inequality and corruption.  
Greater inequality causes higher levels of corruption, and higher levels of corruption 
intensify inequality.  As a result, many societies are likely to be trapped in vicious 
circles of inequality and corruption.  This mutually reinforcing relationship possibly 
explains why income inequality persists within countries over time.      
 
VI. Conclusions and Implications  
In summary, income inequality is likely to be a significant and no less important 
determinant of corruption than economic development (and thus many other variables 
for that matter).  The effect of inequality is likely to be greater in more democratic 
countries.  There is also evidence that suggests that inequality fosters perceptions of 
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widespread corruption and correspondingly habituates norms of corruption as “the 
way things are done”. 
Corruption is also likely to reproduce and accentuate existing inequalities.  
Countries may thus be trapped in vicious circles of inequality and corruption, or 
liberated in virtuous circles of equality and integrity (freedom from corruption).  
This study identified the likely significant relationship between income inequality 
and corruption.  Further investigation of the relationships between other kinds of 
inequality - in wealth, education, political participation, and social opportunities as 
well as gender and ethnic inequality – and corruption might be revealing as well. Our 
analysis also suggests that currently available cross-country measures of (perceived) 
corruption may have systemic and ideological bias. More work will be needed to 
minimize bias as well as measurement error. 
Our findings may contribute to the understanding of three additional important 
subjects. First, corruption is likely to be an important channel through which 
inequality adversely affects economic growth.  Inequality increases corruption, 
which in turn deters investment and growth. Although Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) argued that the adverse effect of inequality on economic 
growth is due to high rates of taxation and redistribution, the results herein suggest an 
alternative explanation with corruption as a causal pathway.  
Secondly, our findings may help to explain why higher levels of market-income 
inequality are not associated with higher levels of redistribution, contrary to the 
prediction of the median voter theorem (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Iversen and 
Soskice 2002). Inequality increases corruption, especially in democracies, and 
corruption produces policy outcomes closer to those preferred by the rich than those 
by the median voter; hence taxation and redistribution in high-inequality societies will 
be lower than predicted by the median voter theorem. Thus, inequality tends to persist 
without convergence across countries over time. 
Thirdly, the significant effect of inequality on corruption may also help to explain 
why larger sizes of government are not associated with higher levels of corruption. 
One recent puzzling empirical finding was that smaller, not larger, government size 
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was associated with higher levels of corruption (La Porta et al. 1999; Friedman et al. 
2000), contradicting previous studies. Extensive redistribution can both increase 
government size and lower corruption if it effectively reduces inequality.  
The corruption literature in the last decades tended to focus on the corrupt and 
rent-seeking behavior of public officials. When corruption is exclusively associated 
with the public sector, the remedy is simple: “If you want to cut corruption, cut 
government” (Becker 1995). But if corruption is the result of the rich attempting to 
preserve and advance their position, and larger government size can be associated 
with less corruption, minimizing the state is not necessarily the appropriate policy 
response.   
Our study thus stresses the need for considering the motivations and opportunities 
for the rich and the private sector to engage in corruption (Glaeser et al. 2003; 
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000). The experience of massive privatization that 
was accompanied by enormous corruption in Eastern European countries offers 
further evidence (Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova 2000; Hellman et al. 2000). We 
also note that the skyrocketing CEO compensation in the US, which was supposed to 
align the interests of CEOs to those of shareholders, not only increased income 
inequality but also stimulated corporate corruption as the recent scandals demonstrate. 
The relationships among government size, quality, and intervention and 
corruption need to be further studied.  What kinds of government intervention are 
more or less prone to different types of corruption as well as what kinds of 
government action are necessary to control corruption may be fruitful avenues for 
research. Although much of literature has stressed the need to minimize government 
regulations and discretion of public officials, it may be the kinds rather than quantities 
of regulation and discretion that are more relevant for controlling corruption. 
Previous studies emphasized the role of economic development and religious and 
colonial traditions in determining levels of corruption. Given the persistence of 
cultures, one way out of corruption seemed to be economic development, but 
corruption is known to hinder economic development. Thus, corruption seemed to be 
destiny.  
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However, redistribution may turn vicious circles into virtuous circles. Democracy 
or political equality is not sufficient to curb corruption without economic equality, 
and democratization in highly unequal societies may even generate increased 
corruption in the short run. One task of politics and public action is to shape 
institutions and social conditions so that people behave honestly, because they believe 
that the basic structure of their society is just (Elster 1987). Corruption might not be 
destiny after all.   
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Inequality and Freedom from Corruption in More vs. Less Democratic 
Countries22
 
                                                 
22 The outlier in the figure for more democratic countries represents Namibia, which has GINI of .75. 
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Table 1. OLS Regression Results for Single-year vs Averaged Data 
         Dependent variable:
     Independent variables:    1995 Data Averaged Data    1995 Data Averaged Data    1995 Data Averaged Data    1995 Data Averaged Data
Gini b -0.558 -1.593 -1.377 -2.210 ** -1.023 ** -1.642 *** -0.916 ** -1.500 ***
(SE) (1.363) (1.540) (1.039) (1.120) (0.467) (0.463) (0.447) (0.439)
B -0.028 -0.077 -0.071 -0.108 -0.113 -0.172 -0.107 -0.167
ln GDPpc b 0.953 *** 0.736 *** 0.867 *** 0.659 *** 0.403 *** 0.313 *** 0.376 *** 0.287 ***
(SE) (0.150) (0.197) (0.120) (0.154) (0.049) (0.062) (0.047) (0.060)
B 0.641 0.461 0.629 0.442 0.632 0.451 0.623 0.438
Political Rights b 0.041 0.301 ** 0.097 0.336 *** 0.067 ** 0.176 *** 0.078 *** 0.174 ***
(SE) (0.089) (0.137) (0.069) (0.104) (0.028) (0.043) (0.027) (0.040)
B 0.033 0.236 0.081 0.278 0.127 0.315 0.157 0.332
ln Openness b 0.310 0.696 ** 0.210 0.603 ** -0.081 0.029 -0.025 0.088
(SE) (0.228) (0.284) (0.203) (0.255) (0.096) (0.114) (0.083) (0.100)
B 0.068 0.159 0.047 0.143 -0.039 0.015 -0.013 0.047
% Protestant 1980 b 3.356 *** 2.893 *** 3.067 *** 2.795 *** 1.129 *** 0.945 *** 0.946 *** 0.822 ***
(SE) (0.562) (0.583) (0.496) (0.512) (0.233) (0.238) (0.227) (0.233)
B 0.349 0.283 0.308 0.265 0.238 0.185 0.211 0.171
Constant b -4.735 *** -5.064 *** -3.546 *** -4.019 *** -2.651 *** -2.530 *** -2.791 *** -2.638 ***
(SE) (1.570) (1.898) (1.362) (1.509) (0.606) (0.626) (0.536) (0.562)
N 72 83 91 102 109 128 109 129
R2 0.753 0.752 0.779 0.768 0.775 0.748 0.769 0.749
Note : For Gini, ln GDP pc, and ln Opennes, averaged data are for the period of 1971-96,  and for Political Rights it is for 1972-96. For percentage Protestant, there
is no averaged data. Throughout the tables, heterokedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, and standardized coefficients (B) are given together
 with regression coefficients. The levels of statistical significance are denoted as follows, unless indicated otherwise; * p<.10,  ** p<.05,  *** p<.01.
CPI 98 CPI 96-02 CCI 98 CCI 96-02
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Table 2. OLS Regression Results for Control of Corruption (CCI 96-02) for Various Models
                              Models:
Gini 71-96 b -3.528 *** -0.569 -1.171 ** -2.072 *** -2.964 *** -2.114 *** -2.146 *** -1.869 ***
(SE) (0.782) (0.527) (0.460) (0.624) (0.684) (0.514) (0.582) -0.585
B -0.392 -0.063 -0.130 -0.230 -0.304 -0.230 -0.240 -0.210
ln GDPpc 71-96 b 0.513 *** 0.329 *** 0.454 *** 0.337 *** 0.320 *** 0.284 *** 0.301 ***
(SE) (0.039) (0.057) (0.038) (0.074) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
B 0.785 0.503 0.695 0.518 0.490 0.430 0.460
Political Rights 72-96 b 0.188 *** -0.004 0.035 0.347 *** -0.012
(SE) (0.041) (0.064) (0.052) (0.122) (0.235)
B 0.358 -0.007 0.070 0.660 -0.020
Pol Rights Squared b 0.034 **
(SE) (0.017)
B 0.570
Gini* (Pol Rights - 4) b -0.774 *** -0.606 *
(SE) (0.301) (0.316)
B -0.550 -0.430
Socialist legal origin b -0.721 *** -0.937 *** -0.786 *** -0.610 *** -0.686 ***
(SE) (0.134) (0.265) (0.203) (0.206) (0.206)
B -0.290
Other controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 129 129 129 129 114 129 129 129
R2 0.153 0.662 0.722 0.723 0.793 0.791 0.808 0.814
Note :  OLS 5 through 8 have additional controls such as trade openness, percentage Protestant population, French, German, and Scandinavian legal origins
(British  legal origin as base category), ethnolinguistic fractionalization, natural resource abundance, and federalism. The coefficients for these control 
variables are not reported, but those for OLS 6 are reported in Table 3.  OLS 5 is based on listwise deletion, while OLS 6 through 8 are based on multiple 
imputation of missing data.
OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) OLS (6) OLS (7) OLS (8) 
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Table 3. IV 2SLS Regression Results for CCI (1996-2002), Compared with OLS (6)
                                   Models:
Gini 71-96 b -7.419 *** -6.163 ** -6.613 ** -8.186 *** -7.334 *** -2.114 ***
(SE) (1.316) (2.415) (2.721) (2.954) (2.508) (0.514)
B -0.820 -0.633 -0.730 -0.806 -0.810 -0.230
ln GDPpc 71-96 b 0.293 *** 0.210 ** 0.197 0.187 0.320 ***
(SE) (0.081) (0.098) (0.185) (0.188) (0.068)
B 0.450 0.320 0.307 0.290 0.490
ln Open 71-96 b 0.181 0.267 * 0.269 0.133 0.182 *
(SE) (0.129) (0.139) (0.280) (0.247) (0.108)
B 0.093 0.140 0.123 0.070 0.100
Pol Rights 72-96 b -0.026 0.003 0.007 0.020 0.035
(SE) (0.071) (0.064) (0.097) (0.089) (0.052)
B -0.048 0.010 0.013 0.040 0.070
% Protestant 80 b 0.888 ** 1.415 ** 1.109 * 1.622 ** 0.609 *
(SE) (0.433) (0.640) (0.574) (0.669) (0.356)
B 0.188 0.290 0.227 0.340 0.130
French legal origin b -0.135 -0.135 -0.034 -0.122 -0.219 *
(SE) (0.163) (0.149) (0.229) (0.194) (0.115)
B -0.067 -0.070 -0.016 -0.060 -0.110
Socialist legal origin b -1.399 *** -1.386 *** -1.464 *** -1.407 *** -0.786 ***
(SE) (0.461) (0.438) (0.526) (0.388) (0.203)
B -0.534 -0.560 -0.427 -0.570 -0.320
German legal origin b -0.357 -0.436 -0.336 -0.473 -0.184
(SE) (0.273) (0.269) (0.300) (0.292) (0.207)
B -0.073 -0.090 -0.071 -0.100 -0.040
Scandinavian b -0.244 -0.679 -0.421 -0.898 0.149
      legal origin (SE) (0.420) (0.594) (0.489) (0.550) (0.314)
B -0.045 -0.120 -0.080 -0.160 0.030
British legal origin (Base category)
Ethnolinguistic b -0.132 -0.337 0.098 -0.340 -0.385 *
     fractionalization (SE) (0.347) (0.293) (0.426) (0.322) (0.212)
B -0.033 -0.080 0.025 -0.080 -0.090
Natural resource b -0.206 -0.152 -0.211 -0.127 -0.248
     abundance (SE) (0.203) (0.204) (0.211) (0.193) (0.198)
B -0.071 -0.050 -0.073 -0.040 -0.080
Federal b 0.025 0.022 0.014 -0.005 0.034
(SE) (0.043) (0.044) (0.062) (0.055) (0.042)
B 0.043 0.040 0.024 -0.010 0.060
Constant b 2.974 *** -0.097 0.305 0.824 1.259 -2.037 ***
(SE) (0.538) (1.268) (1.553) (1.792) (1.725) (0.525)
N 127 114 129 98 129 129
P-value for overidentification test 0.168 0.284 0.763 0.791
Note : IV regressions 1 through 3 instrumented Gini (1971-96) with Mature cohort size (1971-96).  IV regressions 4 and 5 instrumented
Gini (71-96), ln GDPpc (71-96), and ln Open (71-96) with Mature cohort size, Latitude, Malaria index, and Constructed openness.
IV regressions 3 and 5 and OLS 6 are based on multiple imputation of missing data.
IV (5) OLS (6) IV (1) IV (2) IV (3) IV (4) 
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Table 4. Predictors of Norms and Perceptions about Corruption (OLS Estimates)
             Dependent variable:      Bribe Justified Cheat Tax Justified Run by Big Interests Perceived Corruption
Gini 71-96          b 0.027 * 0.016 * 0.005 * 0.006 *
(SE) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
B 0.150 0.070 0.120 0.070
Country-level variables:        B          B          B          B
Pol Rights 72-96 -0.080 * -0.038 * 0.070 * -0.051 *
ln GDPpc 71-96 0.060 * 0.150 * -0.065 * -0.209 *
ln Open 71-96 0.035 * 0.083 * 0.042 * -0.071 *
French legal origin 0.024 0.026 -0.019 0.091 *
Socialist legal origin 0.052 * 0.184 * 0.202 * 0.227 *
German legal origin 0.017 -0.006 0.038 * 0.046 *
Scandinavian legal origin 0.031 * 0.034 * -0.076 * -0.046 *
Individual-level variables: (0.018) (0.025) (0.005) (0.009)
Mature  (Aged 40-59) -0.035 * -0.041 * -0.013 -0.001
Education 0.036 * 0.052 * 0.043 * -0.016 *
Income 0.001 0.009 0.048 * 0.037 *
Subjective class 0.008 0.016 -0.077 * -0.079 *
Unemployed 0.043 * 0.036 * 0.007 0.029 *
Female -0.041 * -0.058 * 0.028 * 0.018 *
Catholic -0.019 -0.041 * -0.072 * -0.039 *
Protestant -0.019 -0.042 * -0.034 * -0.004
Muslim -0.007 -0.009 0.020 * -0.021 *
N of respondents        41476            41049           36530           40005
N of countries              31                 31                 31                 31
R2 0.032 0.076 0.077 0.146
Note :  Micro data are from World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys (1995-97). "Bribe justified" and "Cheating taxes
justified" take the values of one to ten, "Run by big interests" zero or one, and "Perceived extent of corruption" from one to four.
* denotes significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5.  OLS Regressions of Inequality (GINI 1990s) 
                               Models:         OLS 1           OLS 2                 OLS 3   
CCI 96-98 b -4.830 *** -4.772 *** -4.963 ***
(SE) (1.268) (1.338) (1.310)
B -0.430 -0.460 -0.440
   B    B    B
ln GDPpc 71-96 -0.060 0.040 -0.050
Political Rights 72-96 -0.140 -0.140 -0.150
lnOpen 71-96 0.040 0.010 0.040
% Protestant 80 0.400 *** 0.290 *** 0.410 ***
French legal origin 0.010 0.060 0.010
Socialist legal origin -0.540 *** -0.560 *** -0.550 ***
German legal origin -0.140 *** -0.120 *** -0.150 ***
Scandinavian origin -0.310 *** -0.250 *** -0.320 ***
British legal origin (Base category) (4.362) (4.319)
Ethnolinguistic frac. 0.080 -0.020
Natural resource abundance -0.030 -0.030
Federal 0.010 0.000
N 114 102 114
R2 0.521 0.581 0.523
Note : Gini index (1990s) ranges from 0 and 100. OLS 2 takes the method of listwise
deletion. OLS 3 uses the whole sample of countries, for which both GINI (1990s) and 
CCI(96-98) are available, employing the multiple imputation for missing data.  
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Statistical Appendix 
 
 
1. Adjustment of different definitions of gini coefficient 
 
Our adjustment is somewhat different from that of Dollar and Kraay (2002). They 
adjusted by subtracting .04046 from gross-income-based gini, based on the regression 
of gini on gross, expenditure, person, and six regional dummies. We used country 
dummies instead of regional dummies and added decade dummies to control for 
country-specific fixed effects and time effects. Our regression shows that there are 
significant differences between income-based and expenditure-based ginis, but that 
the differences between gross-income-based and net-income-based ginis as well as 
between person-based and household-based ginis are not very significant. We use 
coefficients for ‘gross’ and ‘person’ as well as ‘income’ dummies irrespective of 
statistical significance, because this will produce the best unbiased adjustment. Thus, 
our adjusted ginis are consistent and comparable with household net 
expenditure-based ginis. Our adjustment is basically consistent with Deininger and 
Squire(1996). They report that income-based gini is substantially higher than 
expenditure-based gini. Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2001) also noted that in many cases, 
particularly for poorer countries where direct taxes were nominal, there were 
practically no differences between net income and gross income. However, the 
differences in adjustment produced little practical difference. Our adjusted gini and 
Dollar and Kraay’s adjusted gini showed a correlation coefficient of 0.987. 
 
2. Examination of potential instruments for corruption 
 
We examined settler mortality rates and fraction of English speaking population 
as instruments for (freedom from) corruption. Acemoglu et al. (2001) used settler 
mortality rates as instrument for institutional quality (or risk of expropriation), 
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arguing that European colonial settlers developed good institutions in places where 
settler mortality was low but extractive institutions in places where settler mortality 
was high, which had a long-lasting impact. Hall and Jones (1999) used fractions of 
population speaking English and western languages as the first language as 
instruments for institutional quality, arguing that colonial history represented by these 
instrumental variables matters for institutions. Since corruption is important part of 
the institutional quality, these variables may be good instruments for corruption.  
However, these potential instruments did not have a strong partial correlation with 
corruption, controlling for other variables. The first-stage F-statistics was 
considerably smaller than the safe number of 10. It is known that the use of weak 
instruments can cause a severe bias (Staiger and Stock 1997; Wooldridge 2002). In 
addition, we have some concern that colonial history represented by these variables 
may have had a distributional impact as well.  
Gupta et al. (2002) used English-speaking population, latitude, and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization as instruments for corruption. But our experimentation invalidated 
the use of these instruments, because they jointly had a weak predictive power. Li et 
al. (2000) used Mauro (1995) measure of corruption for 1980-83 and its polynomials 
for instruments for ICRG index of corruption for 1982-1994 and its quadratic term. Li 
et al.’s instruments address the problem of measurement error and associated 
attenuation bias, but not the problem of simultaneity bias due to reverse causality. 
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Table A1. Summary Statistics of the Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gini (avg.1971-96) 129 0.386 0.111 0.173 0.755
Gini (avg.1990-99) 114 0.389 0.107 0.176 0.755
CCI (avg. 1996-2002) 129 0.112 1.000 -1.205 2.390
CPI (avg. 1996-2002) 102 4.522 2.272 1.297 9.724
ICRG (avg. 1996-2002) 110 3.162 1.119 0.795 6.000
CCI (avg. 1996-98) 128 0.109 0.973 -1.232 2.329
CPI (avg. 1996-99) 95 4.628 2.310 1.488 9.818
ln GDPpc (avg. 1971-96) 129 7.570 1.529 4.639 10.615
Political Rights (avg. 1972-96) 129 3.996 1.910 1.080 7.000
lnOpen (avg. 1971-96) 129 4.137 0.540 2.693 5.752
% Protestant (1980) 129 0.125 0.208 0 0.978
French legal origin 129 0.426 0.496 0 1
Socialist legal origin 129 0.202 0.403 0 1
German legal origin 129 0.047 0.211 0 1
Scandinavian legal origin 129 0.031 0.174 0 1
British legal origin 129 0.295 0.458 0 1
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 129 0.413 0.246 0.002 0.926
Natural resource abundance 116 0.240 0.342 0.000 2.604
Federal 126 1.466 1.707 0.000 6.364
Mature chort size 127 0.273 0.047 0.200 0.365
Malaria index (avg.1966 & 94) 120 0.276 0.396 0.000 1.000
Latitude (absolute value/90) 129 0.303 0.196 0.011 0.711
Constructed openness 114 2.820 0.766 0.833 5.639
Bribe justified 73511 1.7587 1.7633 1 10
Cheating on tax justified 72805 2.5010 2.4041 1 10
Run by a few big interests 64807 0.7230 0.4475 0 1
Perceived extent of corruption 67416 2.8996 0.8321 1 4  
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Table A2. Pairwise Correlations between Main Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) CCI 96-02 1
(2) CPI 96-02 0.978 1
(3) ICRG 96-02 0.833 0.843 1
(4) Gini 71-96 -0.392 -0.349 -0.409 1
(5) ln GDPpc7196 0.812 0.812 0.674 -0.418 1
(6) Pol Rights 7296 0.733 0.698 0.648 -0.142 0.708 1
(7) ln Open 7196 0.205 0.260 0.207 -0.054 0.259 0.044 1
(8) Protestant 0.440 0.530 0.506 0.047 0.329 0.382 0.118 1
(9) French legal origin -0.168 -0.180 -0.133 0.284 -0.114 -0.051 -0.219 -0.326 1
(10) Socialist origin -0.237 -0.268 -0.128 -0.444 -0.071 -0.468 0.195 -0.184 -0.433 1
(11) German origin 0.283 0.245 0.173 -0.204 0.323 0.218 -0.060 0.066 -0.190 -0.111 1
(12) Scandinavian origin 0.389 0.434 0.445 -0.175 0.300 0.267 0.004 0.658 -0.154 -0.090 -0.040 1
(13) British origin 0.112 0.135 -0.016 0.244 -0.077 0.265 0.093 0.236 -0.557 -0.325 -0.143 -0.116 1
(14) Ethnolinguistic frac. -0.471 -0.401 -0.385 0.354 -0.497 -0.415 -0.074 -0.082 0.031 -0.077 -0.186 -0.225 0.206 1
(15) Natural resource -0.236 -0.158 -0.219 0.112 -0.112 -0.209 0.030 -0.048 0.065 0.083 -0.128 -0.043 -0.065 0.149 1
(16) Federal 0.403 0.349 0.286 -0.248 0.431 0.482 -0.341 0.110 -0.025 -0.105 0.262 0.045 -0.020 -0.257 -0.116 1
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Table A3. First-stage Reduced-form Regressions of Gini, ln GDPpc, and ln Open
            Dependent variable:
ln GDPpc 71-96 b 0.003
(SE) (0.009)
B 0.047
ln Openness 71-96 b 0.000
(SE) (0.015)
B -0.002
Political Rights 72-96 b -0.006 -0.004 0.145 * 0.000
(SE) (0.007) (0.008) (0.088) (0.038)
B -0.112 -0.080 0.172 0.001
% Protestant (1980) b 0.104 ** 0.127 ** 0.940 0.658 ***
(SE) (0.047) (0.059) (0.592) (0.237)
B 0.214 0.265 0.115 0.258
French legal origin b 0.028 0.030 -0.082 -0.151
(SE) (0.021) (0.022) (0.270) (0.099)
B 0.137 0.146 -0.025 -0.150
Socialist legal origin b -0.080 ** -0.051 -1.264 ** -0.196
(SE) (0.031) (0.036) (0.491) (0.272)
B -0.298 -0.150 -0.235 -0.121
German legal origin b -0.026 -0.015 0.307 -0.249
(SE) (0.024) (0.024) (0.313) (0.157)
B -0.052 -0.032 0.038 -0.099
Scandinavian legal b -0.097 ** -0.076 -0.292 -0.624 ***
    origin (SE) (0.041) (0.053) (0.483) (0.210)
B -0.175 -0.148 -0.032 -0.223
British legal origin (Base category)
Ethnolinguistic b 0.079 ** 0.075 -0.596 0.100
    fractionalization (SE) (0.036) (0.049) (0.429) (0.188)
B 0.193 0.193 -0.099 0.053
Natural resource b -0.007 -0.012 1.001 *** 0.279
    abundance (SE) (0.014) (0.015) (0.322) (0.181)
B -0.025 -0.041 0.222 0.198
Federal b -0.002 -0.003 0.130 ** -0.016
(SE) (0.004) (0.005) (0.055) (0.026)
B -0.041 -0.050 0.136 -0.055
Mature cohort size b -1.544 *** -0.928 *** -0.653 *** 11.995 *** -0.093
    (average 1971-96) (SE) (0.139) (0.256) (0.252) (2.995) (1.651)
B -0.648 -0.421 -0.290 0.322 -0.008
Latitude b -0.147 ** 0.074 -0.163
    (absolute value) (SE) (0.068) (0.933) (0.461)
B -0.280 0.008 -0.060
Malaria index b -0.020 -1.430 *** -0.320 **
  (average 1966 & 94) (SE) (0.030) (0.368) (0.158)
B -0.081 -0.378 -0.271
Constructed Openness b 0.000 0.391 *** 0.496 ***
(SE) (0.012) (0.130) (0.058)
B 0.000 0.166 0.675
Constant b 0.809 *** 0.604 *** 0.590 *** 2.926 *** 2.745 ***
(SE) (0.040) (0.098) (0.074) (0.836) (0.360)
N 127 114 98 119 120
R2 0.420 0.638 0.625 0.761 0.536
F-statistic 123.590 13.100 7.350 17.600 22.510
Over-id test, Prob>F 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note :  Dependent variables are averages for 1971-96. F-statistics are for Ho: Mature cohort size = 0 for the
first two regressions, and Ho: Mature = Latitude = Malaria index = Constructed openness =  0 for the rest.
(5) ln Open(1) Gini (2) Gini (3) Gini (4) ln GDPpc
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 Table A4.  Separate Summary Statistics  for
           Countries with Socialist vs. Non-Socialist Legal Origin
      Socialist origin   Non-Socialist origin       Total Sample
Variable Mean N Mean N Mean N
CCI 96-02 -0.358 26 0.231 103 0.112 129
CPI 96-02 3.428 24 4.858 78 4.522 102
Gini 71-96 0.288 26 0.411 103 0.386 129
ln GDPpc 71-96 7.355 26 7.624 103 7.570 129  
 
Table A5.  Separate Regression Results  for
                 Countries with Socialist vs. Non-Socialist Legal Origin
                          Subsample:       Socialist Legal Origin       Non-Socialist Legal Origin 
            Dependent variable:   CCI 96-02   CPI 96-02   CCI 96-02   CPI 96-02
Gini 71-96 b -1.729 ** -2.983 ** -2.173 *** -2.799
(SE) (0.666) (1.402) (0.753) (1.978)
B -0.264 -0.250 -0.212 -0.120
ln GDPpc 71-96 b 0.248 * 0.455 * 0.470 *** 1.140 ***
(SE) (0.122) (0.265) (0.040) (0.116)
B 0.411 0.390 0.735 0.772
Constant b -1.685 * 0.914 -2.458 *** -3.034 **
(SE) (0.973) (2.174) (0.539) (1.466)
N 26 24 103
R2 0.324 0.293 0.747 0.715
78
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Table A6. OLS Regression Results for CPI 96-02 and ICRG 96-02
            Dependent variable:                                   CPI 1996-2002                                                          ICRG 1996-2002                            
OLS (8) 
Gini 71-96 b -3.972 *** -4.723 *** -4.239 *** -3.470 ** -2.993 *** -2.804 ** -2.749 ** -3.183 ***
(SE) (1.214) (1.753) (1.602) (1.534) (0.915) (1.196) (1.105) (1.136)
B -0.195 -0.209 -0.188 -0.154 -0.303 -0.260 -0.255 -0.296
ln GDPpc 71-96 b 0.772 *** 0.775 *** 0.700 *** 0.735 *** 0.110 0.148 0.088 0.075
(SE) (0.170) (0.192) (0.178) (0.171) (0.097) (0.099) (0.095) (0.094)
B 0.517 0.516 0.467 0.490 0.153 0.202 0.120 0.102
Political Rights 72-96 b 0.035 -0.084 1.321 *** 0.308 0.194 ** 0.184 ** 0.747 *** 1.263 ***
(SE) (0.121) (0.153) (0.373) (0.665) (0.075) (0.079) (0.219) (0.477)
B 0.029 -0.067 1.063 0.248 0.325 0.300 1.216 2.055
Pol Rights Squared b 0.087 * -0.044
(SE) (0.052) (0.039)
B 0.640 -0.642
Gini* (Pol Rights -4) b -3.573 *** -2.938 *** -1.366 ** -1.719 ***
(SE) (0.905) (0.952) (0.540) (0.606)
B -0.983 -0.809 -0.801 -1.008
lnOpen 71-96 b 0.665 *** 0.819 *** 0.806 *** 0.771 ** 0.275 ** 0.339 ** 0.369 ** 0.373 **
(SE) (0.224) (0.274) (0.292) (0.295) (0.119) (0.147) (0.153) (0.153)
B 0.157 0.183 0.180 0.172 0.131 0.151 0.165 0.167
% Protestant 80 b 2.549 *** 2.462 ** 1.677 ** 1.488 * 1.597 *** 1.648 *** 1.513 *** 1.635 ***
(SE) (0.919) (0.971) (0.812) (0.826) (0.585) (0.599) (0.547) (0.536)
B 0.242 0.235 0.160 0.142 0.308 0.314 0.289 0.312
French legal origin b -0.757 *** -0.769 ** -0.588 * -0.620 ** 0.288 0.332 * 0.381 ** 0.409 **
(SE) (0.279) (0.305) (0.312) (0.300) (0.186) (0.190) (0.185) (0.184)
B -0.164 -0.167 -0.128 -0.134 0.128 0.146 0.167 0.180
Socialist legal origin b -1.901 *** -2.423 *** -1.305 * -1.497 ** -0.131 -0.196 0.260 0.349
(SE) (0.442) (0.576) (0.681) (0.680) (0.266) (0.335) (0.353) (0.355)
B -0.357 -0.434 -0.233 -0.268 -0.045 -0.065 0.086 0.115
German legal origin b -0.833 * -1.057 * -1.215 ** -1.211 ** -0.039 -0.083 -0.188 -0.185
(SE) (0.497) (0.559) (0.532) (0.502) (0.235) (0.265) (0.291) (0.289)
B -0.087 -0.106 -0.122 -0.122 -0.008 -0.016 -0.036 -0.035
Scandinavian legal b -0.493 -0.336 -0.257 -0.252 0.295 0.190 0.049 0.024
    origin (SE) (0.862) (0.928) (0.686) (0.707) (0.546) (0.547) (0.465) (0.456)
B -0.042 -0.030 -0.023 -0.023 0.050 0.033 0.009 0.004
British legal origin (Base category)
Ethnolinguistic b -1.013 -1.028 -1.130 -1.229 * -0.087 0.051 -0.087 -0.037
    fractionalization (SE) (0.665) (0.761) (0.682) (0.652) (0.355) (0.382) (0.361) (0.360)
B -0.107 -0.111 -0.122 -0.133 -0.020 0.011 -0.020 -0.008
Natural resource b -0.683 -0.420 -0.444 -0.660 ** -0.546 * -0.483
    abundance (SE) (0.635) (0.590) (0.591) (0.316) (0.325) (0.331)
B -0.068 -0.042 -0.044 -0.155 -0.129 -0.114
Federal b 0.130 0.105 0.068 -0.014 -0.019 -0.003
(SE) (0.104) (0.098) (0.097) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054)
B 0.105 0.085 0.055 -0.022 -0.030 -0.006
Constant b -1.992 -1.856 -7.322 *** -5.142 ** 1.262 0.801 -1.236 -2.322
(SE) (1.612) (1.885) (2.184) (2.527) (0.839) (0.913) (1.381) (1.671)
N 102 91 91 91 110 101 101 101
R2 0.806 0.806 0.836 0.841 0.637 0.650 0.673 0.678
OLS (5) OLS (6) OLS (7) OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 
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Table A7. IV 2SLS Regression Results for CPI 96-02 and ICRG 96-02
            Dependent variable:                                     CPI 1996-2002                                                            ICRG 1996-2002                                  
IV (1) IV (2) IV (3) IV (4) IV (5) IV (6) IV (7) IV (8) 
Gini 71-96 b -5.960 * -5.912 -8.857 * -7.807 * -5.506 ** -4.680 -5.771 -6.419 *
(SE) (3.439) (3.852) (5.074) (4.656) (2.112) (3.107) (3.652) (3.856)
B -0.291 -0.262 -0.407 -0.329 -0.554 -0.435 -0.553 -0.568
ln GDPpc 71-96 b 0.724 *** 0.762 *** 0.527 0.784 ** 0.052 0.120 0.082 0.123
(SE) -0.187 -0.187 -0.402 -0.362 -0.105 -0.096 -0.221 -0.233
B 0.484 0.508 0.361 0.530 0.072 0.163 0.115 0.169
ln Open 71-96 b 0.703 *** 0.822 *** 0.540 0.469 0.315 ** 0.357 ** 0.479 * 0.420
(SE) (0.228) (0.276) (0.351) (0.404) (0.129) (0.150) (0.264) (0.328)
B 0.166 0.184 0.121 0.098 0.151 0.160 0.210 0.171
Pol Rights 72-96 b -0.001 -0.106 0.029 -0.122 0.151 * 0.159 0.140 0.164
(SE) (0.141) (0.183) (0.201) (0.231) (0.088) (0.101) (0.105) (0.110)
B -0.001 -0.085 0.023 -0.095 0.253 0.259 0.229 0.260
% Protestant 80 b 2.921 ** 2.588 ** 4.025 *** 2.958 ** 2.064 *** 1.861 *** 1.952 ** 1.979 ***
(SE) (1.140) (1.022) (1.520) (1.264) (0.671) (0.653) (0.873) (0.737)
B 0.277 0.247 0.383 0.276 0.398 0.355 0.373 0.367
French legal origin b -0.710 ** -0.726 ** -0.585 -0.633 0.332 * 0.387 * 0.331 0.475 *
(SE) (0.295) (0.335) (0.408) (0.409) (0.193) (0.201) (0.255) (0.248)
B -0.153 -0.158 -0.125 -0.135 0.147 0.170 0.145 0.204
Socialist legal origin b -2.214 *** -2.617 *** -2.284 ** -2.602 ** -0.555 -0.501 -0.499 -0.388
(SE) (0.687) (0.911) (0.938) (1.268) (0.474) (0.668) (0.539) (0.747)
B -0.415 -0.468 -0.315 -0.349 -0.192 -0.166 -0.134 -0.100
German legal origin b -0.869 -1.108 -0.914 -1.153 -0.095 -0.169 -0.114 -0.197
(SE) (0.599) (0.610) (0.669) (0.704) (0.270) (0.311) (0.278) (0.314)
B -0.083 -0.111 -0.092 -0.118 -0.018 -0.032 -0.022 -0.039
Scandinavian legal b -0.849 -0.479 -1.614 -0.849 -0.154 -0.051 -0.128 -0.261
    origin (SE) (1.039) (0.994) (1.242) (1.105) (0.660) (0.656) (0.758) (0.676)
B -0.073 -0.043 -0.146 -0.079 -0.026 -0.009 -0.022 -0.046
British legal origin (Base category)
Ethnolinguistic b -1.066 -1.018 -1.198 -0.866 -0.086 0.119 0.094 0.435
    fractionalization (SE) (0.681) (0.777) (0.895) (0.941) (0.384) (0.399) (0.454) (0.441)
B -0.113 -0.110 -0.130 -0.094 -0.019 0.027 0.022 0.100
Natural resource b -0.653 -0.613 -0.638 * -0.695 *
    abundance (SE) (0.643) (0.712) (0.329) (0.387)
B -0.065 -0.061 -0.150 -0.161
Federal b 0.127 0.060 -0.017 -0.060
(SE) (0.102) (0.131) (0.053) (0.082)
B 0.103 0.047 -0.027 -0.094
Constant b -0.837 -1.226 2.232 0.806 2.703 * 1.751 1.932 2.077
(SE) (2.535) (2.517) (4.126) (3.689) (1.479) (1.789) (2.326) (2.316)
N 101 91 86 81 109 101 96 91
P-value for overidentification test 0.122 0.079 0.512 0.326
Note : IV regressions 1, 2, 5, and 6 instrumented Gini (1971-96) with Mature cohort size (1971-96). IV regressions 3, 4, 7, and 8 instrumented Gini (71-96),
ln GDPpc (71-96), and ln Open (71-96)  with Mature cohort size, Latitude, Malaria index, and Constructed openness.
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Table A8. OLS and IV Regressions for Less and More Democratic Countries
                          Subsample:                         Less democratic countries                                               More democratic countries                         
            Dependent variable:               CCI 96-02                        CPI 96-02                         CCI 96-02                        CPI 96-02           
OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV  
Gini 71-96 b -1.154 -0.961 -1.372 0.339 -3.779 *** -6.155 ** -4.892 ** -7.312
(SE) (0.913) (4.482) (2.588) (5.554) (0.836) (2.303) (2.083) (4.961)
B -0.21 -0.18 -0.11 0.03 -0.29 -0.47 -0.16 -0.25
ln GDPpc 71-96 b 0.169 * 0.171 0.428 0.445 0.414 *** 0.362 *** 1.036 *** 1.003 ***
(SE) (0.099) (0.103) (0.294) (0.274) (0.079) (0.100) (0.199) (0.230)
B 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.55 0.48 0.57 0.55
lnOpen 71-96 b 0.313 0.310 0.977 0.962 0.071 0.112 0.442 * 0.463
(SE) (0.272) (0.262) (0.699) (0.689) (0.091) (0.119) (0.248) (0.279)
B 0.23 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09
Political Rights 72-97 b 0.104 0.103 -0.161 -0.153 0.134 * 0.093 0.261 0.186
(SE) (0.105) (0.111) (0.306) (0.308) (0.073) (0.094) (0.170) (0.225)
B 0.11 0.10 -0.07 -0.06 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.08
% Protestant 80 b 0.450 0.413 1.602 1.246 0.362 0.559 1.593 1.712
(SE) (0.399) (0.935) (1.121) (1.627) (0.426) (0.438) (1.350) (1.282)
B 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.19
French legal origin b -0.158 -0.157 -0.644 -0.643 -0.221 -0.083 -0.719 ** -0.579
(SE) (0.219) (0.218) (0.502) (0.522) (0.135) (0.171) (0.321) (0.397)
B -0.13 -0.12 -0.21 -0.21 -0.10 -0.04 -0.15 -0.12
Socialist legal origin b -0.577 -0.545 -1.820 ** -1.515 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
(SE) (0.401) (0.780) (0.845) (1.222)
B -0.43 -0.41 -0.62 -0.51
German legal origin b (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) -0.395 ** -0.423 ** -1.127 ** -1.157 **
(SE) (0.173) (0.195) (0.443) (0.474)
B -0.11 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15
Scandinavian legal b (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 0.147 -0.044 0.114 0.013
    origin (SE) (0.323) (0.343) (1.147) (1.083)
B 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.00
British legal origin (Base category)
Ethnolinguistic b -0.995 *** -1.009 ** -2.835 *** -2.825 *** 0.478 0.537 1.198 1.281
    fractionalization (SE) (0.328) (0.458) (0.793) (0.767) (0.281) (0.329) (0.909) (0.899)
B -0.39 -0.40 -0.49 -0.48 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10
Natural resource b -0.078 -0.082 -0.274 -0.270 -0.906 *** -0.787 *** -1.503 ** -1.395 **
    abundance (SE) (0.146) (0.182) (0.841) (0.805) (0.259) (0.257) (0.691) (0.648)
B -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.20 -0.17 -0.13 -0.12
Federal b -0.001 -0.002 -0.056 -0.060 0.021 0.014 0.042 0.044
(SE) (0.060) (0.058) (0.150) (0.147) (0.042) (0.043) (0.140) (0.145)
B 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Constant b -1.827 ** -1.898 -0.254 -1.072 -2.480 *** -1.185 -4.854 *** -3.455
(SE) (0.838) (1.958) (2.455) (3.708) (0.589) (1.356) (1.478) (3.232)
N 61 61 46 46 53 53 45 45
R2 0.5479 0.5474 0.5895 0.5842 0.9135 0.9003 0.9089 0.9066
Note : The subsamples of more democratic countries and less democratic countries were divided at the political rights score (average for 1972-96) of four.
For IV regressions, Gini (71-96) is instrumented with Mature cohort size (71-96).
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Table A9. OLS & IV Regression Results for High-Income vs Low-Income Countries
                          Subsample:                            Low-income countries                                                    High-income countries                          
            Dependent variable:               CCI 96-02                        CPI 96-02                         CCI 96-02                        CPI 96-02           
OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV  
Gini 71-96 b -0.381 -1.314 1.012 2.182 -3.173 ** -7.014 -5.323 -16.294
(SE) (0.526) (2.662) (2.484) (3.619) (1.314) (6.872) (3.449) (22.178)
B -0.116 -0.400 0.117 0.251 -0.308 -0.681 -0.225 -0.689
ln GDPpc 71-96 b -0.006 -0.020 0.015 0.038 0.557 *** 0.382 1.168 ** 0.658
(SE) (0.066) (0.069) (0.253) (0.262) (0.183) (0.390) (0.548) (1.161)
B -0.016 -0.053 0.016 0.038 0.496 0.341 0.474 0.267
lnOpen 71-96 b 0.180 ** 0.213 * 0.808 ** 0.743 * 0.230 0.151 0.617 * 0.298
(SE) (0.088) (0.116) (0.363) (0.410) (0.157) (0.170) (0.338) (0.637)
B 0.265 0.314 0.448 0.412 0.128 0.084 0.150 0.073
Political Rights 72-97 b -0.018 -0.007 -0.183 -0.202 -0.097 -0.187 -0.123 -0.405
(SE) (0.047) (0.057) (0.169) (0.174) (0.131) (0.236) (0.293) (0.719)
B -0.073 -0.028 -0.264 -0.292 -0.171 -0.327 -0.096 -0.317
% Protestant 80 b -0.695 ** -0.454 -1.648 -2.286 0.723 0.976 2.118 * 2.774
(SE) (0.289) (0.740) (2.682) (2.715) (0.485) (0.783) (1.223) (2.019)
B -0.270 -0.176 -0.182 -0.252 0.190 0.257 0.256 0.335
French legal origin b -0.018 0.015 -0.293 -0.357 -0.304 * -0.273 -1.073 ** -0.955 *
(SE) (0.099) (0.130) (0.392) (0.412) (0.177) (0.189) (0.466) (0.529)
B -0.029 0.023 -0.181 -0.220 -0.143 -0.129 -0.229 -0.203
Socialist legal origin b -0.257 -0.348 -0.794 -0.702 -1.385 ** -2.219 -3.002 ** -5.392
(SE) (0.182) (0.351) (0.634) (0.675) (0.565) (1.704) (1.297) (5.208)
B -0.298 -0.404 -0.384 -0.340 -0.557 -0.893 -0.560 -1.006
German legal origin b (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) -0.691 ** -0.741 ** -1.602 *** -1.667 **
(SE) (0.273) (0.363) (0.574) (0.793)
B -0.200 -0.215 -0.217 -0.226
Scandinavian legal b (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) -0.423 -0.610 -0.929 -1.249
    origin (SE) (0.372) (0.567) (1.046) (1.356)
B -0.111 -0.160 -0.114 -0.153
British legal origin (Base category)
Ethnolinguistic b -0.330 * -0.287 -1.084 -1.052 -0.735 -0.441 -0.766 0.322
    fractionalization (SE) (0.182) (0.247) (0.752) (0.705) (0.716) (0.718) (1.569) (2.344)
B -0.262 -0.228 -0.332 -0.322 -0.144 -0.086 -0.065 0.027
Natural resource b -0.079 -0.083 0.046 0.132 -0.779 ** -0.573 -0.653 -0.281
    abundance (SE) (0.059) (0.064) (0.656) (0.674) (0.320) (0.511) (1.150) (1.443)
B -0.105 -0.110 0.014 0.040 -0.185 -0.136 -0.060 -0.026
Federal b 0.084 *** 0.073 * 0.167 0.178 0.025 0.020 -0.001 -0.007
(SE) (0.031) (0.041) (0.130) (0.120) (0.071) (0.061) (0.172) (0.153)
B 0.334 0.290 0.267 0.285 0.049 0.040 -0.001 -0.006
Constant b -0.805 -0.521 0.529 0.233 -2.820 0.856 -3.449 7.592
(SE) (0.487) (0.897) (2.255) (2.264) (2.248) (7.196) (6.076) (22.981)
N 60 60 42 42 54 54 49 49
R2 0.356 0.320 0.284 0.279 0.802 0.776 0.809 0.773
Note : The subsamples of high-income and low-income countries were divided at the mean of the natural log of GDP per capita (avg. for 1971-96) of 7.57.
For IV regressions, Gini (71-96) is instrumented with Mature cohort size (71-96).
 
 55
Table A10. OLS Regressions of CCI and CPI with Interaction Terms
            Dependent variable:               CCI 96-02                        CPI 96-02           
Gini 71-96 b -3.230 *** -3.162 *** -4.638 *** -4.184 **
(SE) (0.683) (0.666) (1.647) (1.614)
B -0.332 -0.324 -0.206 -0.186
ln GDPpc 71-96 b 0.765 *** 0.323 1.477 *** 0.246
(SE) (0.125) (0.213) (0.376) (0.503)
B 1.174 0.495 0.984 0.164
Political Rights 72-96 b -0.005 0.557 *** -0.076 1.628 ***
(SE) (0.065) (0.206) (0.157) (0.516)
B -0.009 1.049 -0.062 1.311
Gini* (Pol Rights - 4) b -1.378 *** -4.367 ***
(SE) (0.482) (1.347)
B -0.947 -1.202
Gini* (lnGDPpc - 7.57) b -1.131 *** -0.129 -1.852 ** 1.155
(SE) (0.311) (0.512) (0.826) (1.204)
B -0.653 -0.075 -0.448 0.279
lnOpen 71-96 b 0.115 0.185 0.717 ** 0.867 ***
(SE) (0.116) (0.120) (0.278) (0.291)
B 0.059 0.095 0.160 0.194
% Protestant 80 b 0.430 0.397 2.075 ** 1.744 **
(SE) (0.345) (0.317) (0.951) (0.809)
B 0.091 0.084 0.198 0.166
French legal origin b -0.215 -0.194 -0.737 ** -0.568 *
(SE) (0.130) (0.134) (0.297) (0.317)
B -0.107 -0.097 -0.160 -0.123
Socialist legal origin b -0.934 *** -0.572 * -2.279 *** -1.147
(SE) (0.262) (0.313) (0.594) (0.701)
B -0.356 -0.218 -0.408 -0.205
German legal origin b -0.386 -0.392 -1.215 ** -1.152 **
(SE) (0.258) (0.260) (0.550) (0.536)
B -0.079 -0.081 -0.122 -0.116
Scandinavian legal b 0.007 -0.037 -0.341 -0.237
    origin (SE) (0.270) (0.240) (0.836) (0.687)
B 0.001 -0.007 -0.031 -0.021
British legal origin (Base category)
Ethnolinguistic b -0.414 -0.528 ** -1.032 -1.151
    fractionalization (SE) (0.254) (0.251) (0.744) (0.691)
B -0.105 -0.133 -0.112 -0.125
Natural resource b -0.151 -0.202 -0.467 -0.497
    abundance (SE) (0.190) (0.177) (0.642) (0.558)
B -0.052 -0.069 -0.046 -0.049
Federal b 0.029 0.030 0.114 0.109
(SE) (0.043) (0.040) (0.104) (0.097)
B 0.051 0.053 0.092 0.088
Constant b -4.583 *** -3.783 *** -6.953 ** -5.357 *
(SE) (0.926) (1.038) (3.091) (3.127)
N 114 114 91 91
R2 0.812 0.827 0.814 0.838  
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Table A11. OLS Regressions with Region Dummies
            Dependent variable:               CCI 96-02                        CPI 96-02           
Gini 71-96 b -1.562 *** -2.344 *** -2.929 ** -4.045 *
(SE) (0.514) (0.753) (1.257) (2.127)
B -0.173 -0.241 -0.144 -0.179
ln GDPpc 71-96 b 0.343 *** 0.385 *** 0.805 *** 0.828 ***
(SE) (0.082) (0.086) (0.199) (0.231)
B 0.524 0.591 0.539 0.552
Political Rights 72-96 b 0.080 0.023 0.073 0.025
(SE) (0.063) (0.072) (0.153) (0.186)
B 0.152 0.044 0.060 0.020
lnOpen 71-96 b 0.150 * 0.161 0.600 *** 0.670 **
(SE) (0.083) (0.109) (0.194) (0.259)
B 0.081 0.083 0.142 0.150
% Protestant 80 b 0.408 0.421 2.128 *** 2.233 **
(SE) (0.333) (0.320) (0.807) (0.929)
B 0.085 0.089 0.202 0.213
French legal origin b -0.182 -0.194 * -0.648 ** -0.665 **
(SE) (0.112) (0.112) (0.289) (0.293)
B -0.091 -0.097 -0.140 -0.144
Socialist legal origin b -0.029 0.275 -0.062 0.175
(SE) (0.264) (0.321) (0.620) (0.740)
B -0.012 0.105 -0.012 0.031
German legal origin b -0.269 -0.383 * -1.024 ** -1.195 **
(SE) (0.201) (0.225) (0.455) (0.526)
B -0.057 -0.079 -0.107 -0.120
Scandinavian legal origin b -0.071 -0.084 -0.527 -0.544
(SE) (0.269) (0.250) (0.715) (0.795)
B -0.012 -0.016 -0.045 -0.049
British legal origin (Base category)
Ethnolinguistic b -0.680 *** -0.470 * -1.055 * -0.798
    fractionalization (SE) (0.200) (0.277) (0.607) (0.758)
B -0.167 -0.119 -0.111 -0.086
Natural resource b -0.433 *** -0.785
    abundance (SE) (0.143) (0.622)
B -0.148 -0.078
Federal b 0.003 0.039
(SE) (0.036) (0.094)
B 0.006 0.032
East Asia & Pacific b -0.235 -0.230 -0.206 -0.085
(SE) (0.214) (0.231) (0.498) (0.545)
B -0.080 -0.076 -0.031 -0.012
East & Central Europe b -0.964 *** -1.462 *** -2.197 *** -2.723 ***
(SE) (0.257) (0.311) (0.608) (0.671)
B -0.364 -0.522 -0.393 -0.467
Middle East & b -0.284 -0.194 -0.092 0.099
     North Africa (SE) (0.207) (0.237) (0.487) (0.566)
B -0.073 -0.053 -0.010 0.011
South Asia b -0.241 -0.268 -0.917 -0.909
(SE) (0.300) (0.311) (0.721) (0.770)
B -0.047 -0.055 -0.079 -0.082
Sub-Saharan Africa b -0.029 -0.026 -0.106 -0.012
(SE) (0.249) (0.265) (0.531) (0.597)
B -0.013 -0.012 -0.018 -0.002
Latin America & b -0.625 *** -0.498 ** -1.005 * -0.688
     Caribbean (SE) (0.208) (0.214) (0.533) (0.577)
B -0.244 -0.201 -0.173 -0.123
Western Europe as base region
Constant b -2.140 *** -1.967 ** -2.194 -2.127
(SE) (0.688) (0.772) (1.659) (1.897)
N 129 114 102 91
R2 0.832 0.842 0.847 0.845  
 57
 
Table A12.  OLS Regressions of GINI with CPI 
(1) (2)
CPI 96-99 b -1.857 ** -1.361 *
(SE) (0.799) (0.723)
B -0.385 -0.309
ln GDPpc 71-96 b -0.845 -0.461
(SE) (1.196) (1.328)
B -0.114 -0.067
Political Rights 72-96 b -0.995 -1.608
(SE) (1.175) (1.098)
B -0.168 -0.290
lnOpen 71-96 b 1.173 0.410
(SE) (2.133) (2.257)
B 0.059 0.022
% Protestant 80 b 0.217 ** 0.130 **
(SE) (0.094) (0.059)
B 0.448 0.297
French legal origin b 0.439 0.823
(SE) (2.544) (2.863)
B 0.019 0.040
Socialist legal origin b -14.116 *** -16.055 ***
(SE) (2.917) (3.623)
B -0.575 -0.689
German legal origin b -8.860 *** -8.125 **
(SE) (2.568) (3.281)
B -0.169 -0.156
Scandinavian legal b -18.891 ** -13.812 **
    origin (SE) (7.270) (5.241)
B -0.361 -0.305
British legal origin (Base category)
Ethnolinguistic b -1.458
    fractionalization (SE) (5.708)
B -0.036
Natural resource b 0.021
    abundance (SE) (0.032)
B 0.048
Federal b 0.146
(SE) (0.540)
B 0.027
Constant b 53.938 *** 54.922 ***
(SE) (9.571) (11.676)
N 87
R2 0.501 0.574
77
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